This paper demonstrates that even established and verified facts of agreements among producers are not a sufficient condition for cartel identification and, as a consequence, prosecution of agreement participants. Such requires looking at institutional details and the wider context of these and...

In recent years the role of anti-monopoly policy in Russia has grown significantly. The enforcement power of the anti-trust agency has increased dramatically. At the same time adverse trends in competition policy have emerged and strengthened. The main reason was, paradoxically, a growing role...

Competition is the basic concept for both industrial organisation theory and institutional economics. Transition economies, including Russia, are natural laboratories allowing us to trace the emergence of competition, the influence of competition on the conduct of market participants, the...

Type-I and type-II errors effects do matter both from the rules enforcement perspective and vertically upward to rules enactment. The paper support conventional idea about detrimental influence on deterrence of both types of errors. At the same time special role of type-I errors is demonstrated...

This round table presents the materials of the discussion on the research of RANEPA on measuring the impact of weak competition, including: a general approach, as well as the peculiarities and the results of evaluations in selected areas (gas, freight rail transportation, construction,...

This round table presents the materials of the discussion on the research of RANEPA on measuring the impact of weak competition, including: a general approach, as well as the peculiarities and the results of evaluations in selected areas (gas, freight rail transportation, construction,...

The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous...

Certain characteristics of competition policy in Russia still objectively hinder the effectiveness of the leniency program, even after recent changes. (Andrey Shastitko, Bureau of Economic Analysis, & Svetlana Avdasheva, National Research Univ., Higher School of Economics).

Are there grounds to believe that Russian law enforcement follows European practices by borrowing the European norm of collective dominance, and adapting it in Russia to deal with its emerging market economy? (Andrey Shastitko, Bureau of Economic Analysis Foundation)