This paper formallizes stories linking vested interests to the non- adoption of superior technologies. Coalitions of workers skilled in the operation of incumbent technologies lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of better technologies. For reasonable parameter values, we find that...

A key feature of recent work on barriers to technology adoption is the assumption that monopoly rights of insiders are limited by the ability of industry outsiders to enter. This paper endogenizes the decision of a government to provide barriers to technology adoption alone or in combination...

American consumer bankruptcy provides for a Fresh Start through the discharge of a household’s debt. Until recently, many European countries specified a No Fresh Start policy of life-long liability for debt. The trade-off between these two policies is that while Fresh Start provides insurance...

This paper studies the choice between general and specific human capital. A trade-off arises because general human capital, while less productive, can easily be reallocated across firms. Accordingly, the fraction of individuals with specific human capital depends on the amount of uncertainty in...

ex-ante appropriate (good) institutions may appear to be bad ex-post as they make economies vulnerable to shocks such as turbulence. As an example, the firing restrictions in Europe and Japan, which appear to be an inefficient institution ex-post, may have been a part of an efficient arrangement...

There are large countercyclical fluctuations in U.S. bankruptcy filings and real credit card interest rates, while unsecured credit is pro-cyclical. This paper documents the facts and asks whether the predictions of incomplete market models with bankruptcy are consistent with these facts. We...

We propose a simple model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different types...

Financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers’ risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...