We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end...

We study how the vertical industry structure affects investment in network quality and social welfare, with a focus on the prospective deployment of high-speed broadband access networks (the so-called NGA). We model pros and cons of vertical separation, namely, pro-competitive effects and loss...

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus...

We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that...

We study the case where parallel trade (PT) stems from government price controls in a foreign country. We remove the presumption that PT blunts dynamic efficiency if the government has partial commitment ability. We model the R&D firmÕs option to serve the foreign country, and find that PT may...

We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that...

National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are...

It is widely argued that international arbitrage, or parallel trade (PT), trades off static against dynamic efficiency so that, compared with a national exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights, worldwide consumer surplus rises at the expense of R&D investment. We show that this common...

If the access network is an economic bottleneck, then the regulator may consider vertical separation of the telecommunications incumbent. There is the concern that separation dilutes quality-enhancing network investment, and social welfare. We show that, despite some loss of operational...

We analyze the impact of access price regulation on the entrants' investment in network quality. We consider a dynamic framework where developing an alternative infrastructure requires both time and a captive customer base. We show that a multi-period schedule where regulated access charges rise...