We construct a model of multi-unit auctions in which I bidders bid for two indivisible units of a common value good. Using a first-order approach, we find that there are equilibria in which bidders bid the same price for both units in the discriminatory auction, but not in the uniform auction....

We study under which conditions a learning by doing effect in the industry causes a monopolist to operate at a loss for some initial periods. Those conditions involve a parameter of the learning process, the slope of inverse demand function and the discount parameter. In order to get results, we...

este trabajo resume las principales contribuciones hechas por la literatura del crecimiento endógeno relacionadas con la interacción entre desigualdad y crecimiento, reseña los principales determinantes de esta interacción en la investigación empírica reciente y los contrasta con la...

The Spanish Treasury is the only Treasury in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government debt: winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids, and pay the weighted average...

This paper explains three things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price equilibria...

This paper explores Spanish Treasury bond auctions both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In the theoretical analysis we present a model to explore the revenue efficiency of Spanish Treasury bond auctions. Given the complexity of the Spanish auction game, the model abstracts from...

This paper explains four things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual hops for consumers with Internet access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price equilibria...

We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strategically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction,...