We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design...

We use a simple theoretical model of a monetary union where myopic discretionary fiscal policies generate excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following a shock. We advocate the adoption of a flexible debt targeting approach. By setting a...

There have been widespread criticisms of EMU fiscal institutions. We consider a simple alternative to the deficit ceilings envisaged in the Stability and Growth Pact. We advocate the adoption of deficit targets. National governments should retain discretion in setting deviations from targets,...

This paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary policy and the issue of central bank independence. In a regime of partial independence, central bank's policy responses are not immune from partisan influences. Still, the latter fail to affect systematically the...

Building on widespread criticisms of current EMU institutional arrangements, we sketch a reform proposal for EMU macroeconomic institutions. We advocate the adoption of targets for both monetary and fiscal policies, to be integrated by a system of checks and balances. As for fiscal policy,...

We reconsider Svensson’s inflation-targeting proposal in a model where the need to raise seigniorage revenues determines the socially optimal inflation rate and distortionary taxes cause the inflation bias. Interpreting the targets as contracts, we show that the interaction between fiscal and...

This paper contributes to the goal-versus-instrument independence debate for the ECB, exploring how alternative monetary arrangements perform when the fiscal authority pursues a strategy of debt reduction in the long term but retains fiscal flexibility in response to supply shocks. If fiscal...