In the last decade, behavioral economics, borrowing from psychology and sociology to explain decisions inconsistent with traditional economics, has revolutionized the way economists view the world. But despite this general success, behavioral thinking has fundamentally transformed only one field...

Mechanism design or implementation theory, which studies the design of institutions or mechanisms implementing collective decisions under different circumstances, has been a major research area in the last three decades. hannu Vartiainen's doctoral dissertation analyzes several issues in this...

Business firms operate in a certain environment in which they interact with one another, with individuals, governmental organizations, financial institutions and various other interest groups. Operation of respective social networks (both voluntary and private market-determined) may have an...

Direct investment outflow from transition economies abroad is still modest compared to investment inflow towards transition economies. Global economy both creates preconditions for and also motivates the internatio¨nalization of banks. The main aim of the article is to study activities of...

Business firms operate in a certain environment in which they interact with one another, with individuals, governmental organisations, financial institutions and various other interest groups. Operation of respective economic and social networks (both voluntary and private market determined) may...

We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is...

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining...

We show that whenever a decision maker reasons about an optimal decision he is able to find one, even with non-transitive preferences. The existence of a reasoning process allows him to strategically manipulate how he reasons. A reasoning strategy that is robust against (finite) deviations is...