This paper develops a principal-agent model of the firm in which shareholders give an incentive contract to a manager to limit the socially costly extraction of private benefits, and to induce truthful revelation of the manager's type. We assume a type-dependent reservation utility. More...

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model....

[fre] Nous analysons le contrat de concession concernant l'exploitation d'une ressource non renouvelable lorsque l'opérateur minier détient une information privée sur ses coûts. Nous montrons que l'arbitrage " traditionnel " rente-efficacité consistant à diminuer la production par rapport...

This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good. In contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result in the standard screening model, we show that the presence of a delay cost borne by users leads to upward distortions in consumption for the high-demand users.

In this paper, we design the optimal procurement mechanisms when bidders are privately informed on efficiency and on observable but neither verifiable nor contractible quality. We show that most of the optimal procurement institutions are mixed procedure implying both separation and pooling....

Cet article étudie les marchés publics à tranches. Ces procédures sont caractérisées par la présence d'une incertitude sur la réalisation complète d'une opération. Celle-ci est alors découpée en plusieurs travaux (tranches) qui doivent être réalisés successivement. La première...

This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good. In contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result in the standard screening model, we show that the presence of a delay cost borne by users leads to upward distortions in consumption for the high-demand users.

In common value models, it is possible that the full information efficiency and the incentive constraint require the quantity of full and asymmetric information to move in opposite directions with the type. This conflict is called non-responsiveness. Most of those models share the features that...