This paper studies multilateral negotiations among n players in an environment where there are externalities and contracts forming coalitions can be written and renegotiated. The negotiation process is modeled as sequential game of offers and counteroffers, and the study focus on the stationary...

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

The market for public firms issuing private equity, debt, and convertible securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. Our results show asymmetric information plays a major role in the choice of security type within public and private...

We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure ( Reg FD') by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure,' in which companies give material information only to a few...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems where the underlying economic opportunities are described by a partition function. This classic bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or...