A patent only protects an innovator from others producing the same product, but it does not protect him from others producing better products under new patents. Therefore, one may divide up the source of competition facing an innovator into within-patent competition, which results from...

A patent protects an innovator only from others who produce the same product, but it does not protect him from others who produce better products under new patents. Previous work has emphasized that intellectual property regulations stimulate research and development by protecting innovative...

The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the US Pharmaceuticals Industry

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of private HIV information on sexual activity showing how the private information provided by a public testing program would change the allocation of information generated in absence o fthe program.

This paper analyzes how markets for old-age care respond to the aging of populations. We consider how the biological forces, which govern the stocks of frail and health persons in a population, interact with economic forces, which govern the demand for and supply of care. We argue that aging...

This paper discusses experimental design from an efficiency viewpoint. We interpret the design of social experiments as an economic intertemporal consumpion problem, as opposed to a statistical variance minimization problem, and contrast the difference between Pareto optimal sample size and...

This paper discusses goods for which the amount of consumption determines its duration, with our primary concentration on health-related consumption. We argue that the features of such goods result in unique implications for private pricing and R&D, as well as impact important components of...

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