This paper studies the role of labor market institutions on unemployment and on the cyclical properties of job flows. We construct an intertemporal general equilibrium model with search unemployment and endogenous job turnover, and examine the consequences of introducing an unemployment benefit,...

We offer an alternative explanation for the decline in labor force participation of senior workers. Typically, tax and transfer explanations have been proposed. On the contrary, a model with imperfectly competitive labor market allows to consider as well the effects of a drop in bargaining...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...

Population aging is a phenomenon common to all regions in the developed world, forcing most governments to implement structural reforms in order to avoid the development of fiscal imbalances. In Luxembourg, large inflows of – young – foreign workers generate an apparently sound public...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers’ bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...

The contrast between the evolution over the last decades of the EU and the US unemployment rates, especially for the low-skilled, is well known. A consensus view is that these different outcomes can be explained by the interactions between common shocks and specific institutional setups. In this...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated for each period. The workers' bargaining power in the working time negotiations affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i)...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...