We study the conflict of interests between the limited partners (LPs) and the general partner (GP) in a venture capital (VC) fund with a limited life span. LPs commit money, while the GP selects and monitors projects. Midway into the project, the GP privately observes the project’s quality and...

This paper studies entrepreneurs' choice of investors, who must provide financial capital and effort for projects with externalities. Venture capitalists (VCs) and individual investors (angels) compete to finance the projects. VCs seek to invest into a portfolio of projects, while angels have...

This paper studies how strategic interaction between players can influence their decisions as to whether to acquire information and whether to reveal their private information to others. We show how a player can increase his utility by disclosing part of his private information, when such...

We present a general equilibrium model where the Walrasian labor market is replaced by a setup in which unemployed workers search for employment opportunities.

This paper studies contracts between brokers and investors when investors are heterogeneous and their types are non-contractible. We identify two novel features of the commission contract (in addition to the risk-sharing argument suggested in Brennan and Chordia 1993) wich help explain its...