Showing 1 - 10 of 148
We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted "in context", making explicit reference to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011038804
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178691
This paper synthesizes findings from an ongoing research program on learning in signaling games. The present paper focuses on crossgame learning (the ability of subjects to take what has been learned in one game and generalize it to related games), an issue that has been ignored in most of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005820409
We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and magagers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted ""in context"" making explicit reference to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005685471
One of the dividing lines between economics and psychology experiments is that economists favor abstract context while psychologists favor meaningful context. We investigate the effects of meaningful versus abstract context on cross-game learning in a signaling game experiment. With individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517885
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135589
In an experimental investigation of Milgrom and Roberts' (1992) model, play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium, providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts. Play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima, followed by an attempt to pool, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146450
We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237686
Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho-Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565552
The existence of base rate fallacy (BRF) bias is explored employing: (i) a context treatment with a narrative story applied to asset markets and (ii) an isomorphic abstract setting using balls-and-bingo cages. Probability estimates reflect a BRF bias in both treatments, but is stronger with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005542761