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We prove that the core of an assignment game (a two-sided matching game with transferable utility as introduced by Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is stable (i.e., it is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) if and only if there is a matching between the two types of players such that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598410
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Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279142
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091845
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We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375608
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154532
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268412
We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095057
It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) games is characterized by various combinations of axioms containing some versions of the reduced game property, of its converse, or of the reconfirmation property with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818958