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We examine whether a simple agent--based model can generate asset price bubbles and crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning with the work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076911
Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, lastminute or “late” bidding is frequently observed in “hard-close” but not in “soft-close” versions of these auctions. In this paper, we introduce an independent private-value repeated internet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561497
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We develop a model of internet auctions with the aim of understanding how rules for ending such auctions (a "hard"- or "soft"-close) affect bidding behavior. We model bidding strategies using finite automata and report results from simulations involving populations of artificial bidders who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135687
Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630863
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Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407544
Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at Business Schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: Bids are used to infer student preferences and bids are used to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407566
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407604
In September of 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned as unsuccessful the attempt—the sixth since 1978—to regulate the dates at which law students are hired as clerks by Federal appellate judges. The market promptly resumed the unraveling of appointment dates that had...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408227