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We incorporate reference-dependent worker behavior into a search-matching model of the labor market, in which firms have all the bargaining power and productivity follows a log-linear AR(1) process. Motivated by Akerlof (1982) and Bewley (1999), we assume that existing workers' output falls...
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A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the principal knows that the agent’s tastes are changing, the agent believes that with probability ?, their future preferences will be identical to their present preferences. The...
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We study a repeated principal-agent interaction, in which the principal offers a "spot" wage contract at every period, and the agent’s outside option follows a Markov process with i.i.d shocks. If the agent rejects an offer, the two parties are permanently separated. At any period during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083343
We incorporate reference-dependent preferences into a search-and-matching model of the labor market, in which firms have all the bargaining power and productivity follows an AR(1) process. Motivated by Akerlof (1982) and Bewley (1999), we assume that existing workers are willing to exert unobserved,
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083374
Can a competitive market implement an ideal search engine? To address this question, we construct a two-sided market model in which consumers with limited, idiosyncratic vocabulary use keywords to search for their desired products. Firms get access to a keyword if they pay its competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083925
What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084519
We study a repeated principal-agent interaction, in which the principal offers a "spot" wage contract at every period, and the agent’s outside option follows a Markov process with i.i.d shocks. If the agent rejects an offer, the two parties are permanently separated. At any period during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185834