In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2...

In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2...

We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for...

We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε0, in a class of multi-player games with perfect information, which we call free transition games. The novelty is that a non-trivial class of perfect information games is solved for subgame-perfection, with multiple...

We present a complete picture of the relationship between the existence of 0-optimal strategies and ε-optimal strategies, ε>0, in the classes of stationary, Markov and history dependent strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

We examine n-player stochastic games. These are dynamic games where a play evolves in stages along a finite set of states; at each stage players independently have to choose actions in the present state and these choices determine a stage payoff to each player as well as a transition to a new...

We present a complete picture of the relationship between the existence of 0-optimal strategies and ε-optimal strategies, ε>0, in the classes of stationary, Markov and history dependent strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

We examine n-player stochastic games. These are dynamic games where a play evolves in stages along a finite set of states; at each stage players independently have to choose actions in the present state and these choices determine a stage payoff to each player as well as a transition to a new...