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A long tradition suggests a fundamental distinction between situations of risk, where true objective probabilities are known, and unmeasurable uncertainties where no such probabilities are given. This distinction can be captured in a Bayesian model where uncertainty is represented by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154919
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708238
We show that a simple "reputation-style" test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use "counterfactual"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231520
We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert is required to submit a date T by which he will have learned enough to deliver a sharp, testable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860972
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We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783177
A long tradition suggests a fundamental distinction between situations of risk, where true objective probabilities are known, and unmeasurable uncertainties where no such probabilities are given. This distinction can be captured in a Bayesian model where uncertainty is represented by the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010680350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408890
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127591
We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action a<sub>i</sub> is played by a type t<sub>i</sub> in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of t<sub>i</sub> for which a<sub>i</sub> is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970153