We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted … versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for …

The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be … strict preferences. This solution, which always exists, either gives the matchings in the core or predicts some other … matchings when the core is empty. Furthermore, it satisfies an interesting property of outer stability. We also characterize the …

In this paper we consider solutions which select from the core. For games with side payments with at least four players …, it is well-known that no core-selection satifies monotonicity for all coalitions; for the particular class of core …-selections found by maximizing a social welfare function over the core, we investigate whether such solutions are monotone for a given …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …