We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority...

We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority...

We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem:...

We present an envelope theorem for establishing first-order conditions in decision problems involving continuous and discrete choices. Our theorem accommodates general dynamic programming problems, even with unbounded marginal utilities. And, unlike classical envelope theorems that focus only on...

Classical models of money are typically based on a competitive market without capital or credit. They then impose exogenous timing structures, market participation constraints, or cash-in-advance constraints to make money essential. We present a simple model without credit where money arises...

Classical models of money are typically based on a competitive market without capital or credit. They then impose exogenous timing structures, market participation constraints, or cash-in-advance constraints to make money essential. We present a simple model without credit where money arises...

We consider a general equilibrium model where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Agents have stochastic preferences and face random buying and selling opportunities. We show that the Friedman rule is just the second best policy. However, the Friedman rule is Pareto optimal. It requires...

We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how the economy functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given and the provision of a public good is financed through a proportional tax. Voters and politicians do not know the true production function for the public good, but...

The paper relaxes the one unit storage capacity imposed in the basic search-theoretic model of fiat money with indivisible real commodities and indivisible money. Agents can accumulate as much money as they want. It characterizes the stationary distributions of money and shows that for...

Why is money divisible? To explore this question we introduce a mismatch problem into search-theoretic models of monetary exchange. We use alternative assumptions about the divisibility of goods and money and the ability of agents to use lotteries on money. Our framework potentially generates...