Coleman [1971. Control of collectives and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp. 269ï¾–298] suggested two indices of voting power, power to prevent an action and power to initiate an action. This paper rigorously...

Coleman [Coleman, J.S., 1971. Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Leberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York] proposed a measure of the power that a decision-making body has to pass any bill that comes before it. He termed it ﾓthe power...

This paper develops a new axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf index of power using four axioms from four different contributions to the area. A nice feature of the characterization is independence of the axioms showing importance of each of them in the exercise.

In this paper we establish equivalence between six collections of axioms that all characterize the Carreras-Coleman decisiveness index. Axioms in each of the different sets are shown to be independent.

This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power determines the ability of a voter to influence the outcomes of the voting bodies he belongs to. In a weighted majority game each voter is assigned a certain nonnegative real number weight and there...

 

 

 

According to Colemanï¾’s index of collective power, a decision rule that generates a larger number of winning coalitions imparts the collectivity a higher a priori power to act. By the virtue of the monotonicity conditions, a decision rule is totally characterized by the set of minimal...