Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

It has often been claimed that the current allocation of votes among EU states is not fair. In this paper, the authors verify this assertion by carrying out an evaluation of the distribution of power among the member states. The results show that the current distribution of votes for the...

The European Union decision-making process involves three main actors : the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. Depending on the issue which is voted upon, there are three possible procedures to make a decision. These are : the proposal procedure, the cooperation procedure...

The aim of this paper is to determine the representation of parties in a Parliament that guarantees an equal representation of all the citizens. This problem is illustrated in the Israeli Knesset.

In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in...

Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed "natural" postulates that a measure of a priori voting power "should" satisfy, the violations of which are...

In this paper, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are...

This paper deals with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of voting power. As voting procedures are modeled as simple games and power evaluated through power indices, two approaches are possible to deal with inequality in this context, depending on whether the power profiles...

In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or...