When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher...

The theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for...

Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a...

This paper investigates extensions of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics to the framework in which each agent is endowed with three types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation, an opportunity preference relation, and an overall preference relation. It is shown...

Using an extended framework in which an agent is endowed with three types of preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity preference order, and an overall preference order, this paper introduces several notions related to efficiency and equity-as-no-envy and examines the...

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and nondictatorship principles are...

We study the possibility of making social evaluations independently of individual preferences over non-consumed commodities. This is related to the well-known problem of performing international comparisons of standard of living across countries with different consumption goods. We prove...

In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstrating that the market mechanism also promotes individual freedom efficiently. This paper has a two-fold purpose. First, in order to investigate extensions of the first and the second welfare...

In this paper, we consider a natural procedure of decision-making, called a “Grouping Choice Method”, which leads to a kind of bounded rational choices. In this procedure a decision-maker (DM) first divides the set of available alternatives　into some groups and in each group she chooses...