We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We show that restricted...

It is a well-known fact that in some economic environments, non-bossiness and monotonicity are interrelated. In this paper, we have presented a new domain-richness condition called weak monotonic closedness, on which non-bossiness in conjunction with individual monotonicity is equivalent to...

We consider the problem of sharing a good, where agents prefer more to less. In this environment, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next by constructing a...

We consider the problem of sharing a divisible good, where agents prefer more to less. First, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next, by constructing a system...

We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity, a...

We consider the problem of sharing a good, where agents prefer more to less. In this environment, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property:no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next,by constructing a system...

In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism....

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely...