We assume that individuals can fully insure themselves against cross-country shocks, but not against individual-specific shocks. We consider two particular models of limited risk-sharing: domestically incomplete markets (DI) and private information-Pareto optimal (PIPO) risk-sharing. For each...

Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2007) describe two different models (Private Information Pareto Optimal and Incomplete Markets) of how households partially insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. They demonstrate that the models differ in terms of their implications for real exchange rates....

In this paper, we consider a dynamic economy in which the agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time in an arbitrary fashion. We consider an asset pricing equilibrium in which equilibrium quantities are constrained Pareto optimal. Under the assumption...

This paper examines the properties of efficient sustainable allocations in an environment in which two agents want to share risk, have perfect information about each other, but cannot make commitments about future transfers. I describe as sustainable any allocation that can be supported as a...

This paper uses an example to show that a model that fits the available data perfectly may provide worse answers to policy questions than an alternative, imperfectly fitting model. The author argues that, in the context of Bayesian estimation, this result can be interpreted as being due to the...

In a wide range of economic settings, equilibrium outcomes in pure credit equilibria are known to be Pareto optimal (or Pareto optimal given informational or enforcement limitations). In a series of examples, I demonstrate how the above equivalence result can be used to provide a more complete...