We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advatange of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players may...

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games,...

Sufficient conditions are given for large replica games without side payments to have non-empty approximate cores for all sufficiently large replications. No "balancedness" assumptions are required. The conditions are superadditivity, a very weak boundedness condition, and convexity of the...

A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all...

We consider a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding in which we make a distinction between the tastes and crowding characteristics of agents. It is possible in this model to have taste-homogeneous jurisdictions that take advantage of the full array of positive...