This paper investigates the time-varying behavior of systematic risk for eighteen pan-European industry portfolios. Using weekly data over the period 1987-2005, three different modeling techniques in addition to the standard constant coefficient model are employed: a bivariate t- GARCH(1,1)...

This paper investigates the time-varying behavior of systematic risk for eighteen pan-European sectors. Using weekly data over the period 1987- 2005, four different modeling techniques in addition to the standard constant coefficient model are employed: a bivariate t-GARCH(1,1) model, two Kalman...

This paper investigates the time-varying behavior of systematic risk for 18 pan-European sectors. Using weekly data over the period 1987-2005, six different modeling techniques in addition to the standard constant coefficient model are employed: a bivariate t-GARCH(1,1) model, two Kalman filter...

This paper proposes a straightforward Markov-switching asset allocation model, which reduces the market exposure to periods of high volatility. The main purpose of the study is to examine the performance of a regime-based asset allocation strategy under realistic assumptions, compared to a buy...

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? The adoption by Tunisia of structural reforms of its economy in a context of gradual opening since 1986, had allowed the instauration in January 1993 of the convertibility of its current...

The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer...

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff...

This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public goods decision, affects social...

We study the issue of project choice when a risk-averse agent must choose whether to invest in two projects of the same type (focus) or of different types (diversification). Projects of the same type are subject to common type-specific shocks. Hence focusing is more risky within each period, but...

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...