Showing 1 - 10 of 77
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385001
Excludable and congestible shared goods - club goods (e.g., internet access facilities) - are more prevalent than Samuelsonian public goods. Our example shows that, unlike the usual presumption with pure public goods, the optimal second-best supply of a club good might exceed its first-best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629659
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499608
Exant theoretical studies of goodwill have, with one exception, explored the relationship between advertising and sales. We construct a simple model of the firm's pricing and quality control when it loses goodwill, hence future sales, should it produce defective commodities. Given a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747085
Goldman's model of flexibility and portfolio choice with random preferences is extended to the case of two assets alternative to money. The asset highest yielding to maturity, but least flexible, is ex ante divisible but ex post indivisible. This asset is always chosen alongside money initially,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748185
The public sector supplies a club good financed by either a head tax or proportional taxation on exogenous incomes in a democracy. For a class of utility functions and club quality functions, the optimal club quality is independent of the income distribution, and hence of the identity of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561946
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005145970
I model a single-club economy with heterogeneous consumers as an aggregative game. I give a sufficient condition, normality of demand for the club good in full income, for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilbrium by the Cornes-Hartley (2007) method. Then, confining attention to club...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548252
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005493043
This paper develops a hierarchical principal-agent model to explore the influence of corruption, bribery, and politically provided oversight of production on the efficiency and level of output of some publicly provided good. Under full information, an honest politician acheives the first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422694