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Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network

Ju, Biung-Ghi - Econometric Society - 2004

formed if members of the coalition are connected on a communication network, or a graph. We offer a characterization of non … characterization results established with the assumption of complete network (complete graph) in various specialized settings. Moreover …-manipulable division rules without any assumption on the structure of communication network. As corollaries, we obtain a number of earlier …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130230

Coalitional manipulation on networks

Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 627-662

by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a … full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a … variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a “bridge”, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043011

Non-Manipulable Division Rules in Claim Problems and Generalizations

Ju, Biung-Ghi; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Sakai, Toyotaka - Department of Economics, University of Kansas - 2003

This paper studies the problem of allocating divisible resources among agents based on their characteristics. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, which allocates the liquidation value of a bankrupted firm to creditors based on their claims. By allowing agents' characteristics to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057403

A Single-Mindedness model with n generations

Emanuele, Canegrati - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835397

N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division

Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Klamler, Christian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good, such as land. A perfect division of cake is efficient (also called Pareto-optimal), envy-free, and equitable. We give an example of a cake in which it is impossible to divide it among three players such that these three properties are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325605

The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

Borm, Peter; Ruys, Pieter H.M.; Ju, Y. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092734

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186244

Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818647

Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012

In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798193

Congestion in irrigation problems

Jaramillo, Paula - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2013

Consider a problem in which the cost of building an irrigation canal has to be divided among a set of people. Each person has different needs. When the needs of two or more people overlap, there is congestion. In problems without congestion, a unique canal serves all the people and it is enough...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763922