In this paper we consider solutions which select from the core. For games with side payments with at least four players, it is well-known that no core-selection satifies monotonicity for all coalitions; for the particular class of core-selections found by maximizing a social welfare function...

In a recent work by Dolan and Edlin it is concluded that no link can be established between cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). However, the conclusion seems to depend rather heavily on what is understood by a link between CBA and CEA as well as on the exact...

Measures of health status, such as e.g. the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years) measure, have been proposed as a tool in the economic assessment of new medical technologies, and its possible foundations in individual utility theory have been discussed in the literature. However, the problems of...

A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative...

We assess environmental performance across product types and across household types in order to evaluate environmental pressure from human activities. To so do, we combine family budget statistics, input-output tables, energy and material flow matrices, various types of emissions and...

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim et al. [5]. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of coalitions in...