Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each...

We consider international negotiations on the level of global pollution, and examine the Lindahl solution which determines the distribution of the pollution permits with unanimous agreement. We show various properties to clarify difficulties to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation as an...

This paper considers the financing of production in a two period general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. This requires a model where the efficient boundary of the production set available to a producer in period two in every state of the world is not independent of the financial...

This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives.

We design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. This agency’s objective...

We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global...