Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Bayesian Statisticians, decision theorists, and game theorists often use Bayesian representations to describe the probability distribution governing the evolution of a stochastic process. Generally, however, one given distribution has infinitely many different Bayesian representations. This...

Consider a probability distribution governing the evolution of a descrete-time stochastic process. Such a distribution may be represented as a convex combination of more elementary probability measures, with the interpretation of a two-stage Bayesian procedure. In the first stage, one of the...

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be maintined...

A probability distribution governing the evolution of a stochastic process has infinitely many Bayesian representations of the form mu = integral operator [subscript theta] mu[subscript theta] delta lambda (theta). Among these, a natural representation is one whose components (mu[subscript...