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This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in...
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This paper considers the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by some sort of random stable mechanism, such as that discussed in Roth and Vande Vate (1990). A one period game is studied in which all stable matchings can be achieved as equilibria; in a natural class...
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