We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the...

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the...

In a recent paper Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) investigate a model of meetings with costly participation. Their main result is that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme. In particular, when the policy space is one-dimensional and the policy...

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus...

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two...

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance...

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy...

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the...