Tripartite contracts between workers, a firm, and an insurance broker Pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible. They do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others. We show that...

In the presence of asymmetric information, adding a public unemployment insurance to labor contracts is potentially Pareto improving. Unfortunately, most successful mechanisms are manipulable by coalitions. This leads us to design coalition incentive compatible unemployment insurance systems....

THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TEMPORAL ERROR TERMS ∈ t AND ∈t-n DECLINES AS n INCREASES CAN BE JUSTIFIED BY APPEALING TO FIRST OR SECOND ORDER MAR-KOV PROCESSES OR TO SPECTRAL ANALYSIS, BUT A SIMILAR ASSUMPTION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED FOR SPATIAL ERROR TERMS. THIS...