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We consider the problem of a principle who wishes to induce two agents playing a one shot prisoner's dilemma to behave cooperatively. We assume that the principal cannot observe the actions of the agents, and is not able to change the strategy sets or payoff functions in the underlying game. The...
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Can the author always design a game form so that all its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim envy-free efficient in asymmetric information economies? The author shows that the answer is no. Given that such games exist in complete...
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The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma has a multiplicity of Pareto-unranked equilibria. This leads to a battle of the sexes problem of coordinating on a single efficient outcome. One natural method of achieving coordination is for the players to bargain over the set of possible equilibrium...
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The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972948
The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma has a multiplicity of Pareto-unranked equilibria. This leads to a battle of the sexes problem of coordinating on a single efficient outcome. One natural method of achieving coordination is for the players to bargain over the set of possible equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836020
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