Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that...

In this note we examine four standard multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in the presence of synergy. The structure of the equilibrium bidding strategy under each rule is quite intuitive. Whether the equilibrium involves "bundle-bidding" or "separating-bidding" strategy depends on the presence of the...

Given an externality function that implements a social objective, this paper examines the possibility of implementing the social objective when the action is observed with error. Provided that the signal is informative in the sense that it separates certain distributions of actions and agents...

type="main" <p>A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic...</p>

Should a seller use a multi-unit auction for identical and indivisible units of a good? We show, under specific assumptions on the value distributions of the bidders, that in large markets the multi-unit format generates higher (lower) expected revenue compared to the bundled format when the...

In this note we examine four standard multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in the presence of synergy. The structure of the equilibrium bidding strategy under each rule is quite intuitive. Whether the equilibrium involves "bundle-bidding" or "separating-bidding" strategy depends on the presence of the...

The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean...

This paper considers a uniform-price auction in which each of n symmetric bidders can place, say, M bids. Each bidder has privately known, decreasing marginal values from an arbitrary M -dimensional distribution. We provide a quantile-type description of the asymptotic price that appropriately...