We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all...

We study a model in which two carriers choose networks to connect cities and compete for travelling customers. We show that if carriers compete aggressively (e.g., Bertrand-like behavior), one carrier operating a single hub-spoke network is an equilibrium outcome. Competing hub-spoke networks...

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

We classify the responses to owr paper " On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall" and address some of the points raised.

We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private...

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private...