In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office on the part of citizens with heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our...

This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a...

Some recent health economics papers suggest that increasing wage in the nursing labor market with the aim of reducing shortage may yield a negative effect on the average productivity and/or the average motivation of applicants attracted. Some feminist economics papers criticize this inefficiency...

We consider an economy made up by two industrial sectors. Sector A produces a good. Sector B supplies a social service. Each industry is characterized by a Hotelling-type linear segment where two firms are located at the extremes. We compare two different economic systems. A market economy where...

In this article we study the corporate tax effects on credit market equilibria. In particular, we develop a model that accounts for five pieces of evidence: i) the existence of a tax incentive to borrow, ii) the negative relationship between leverage and profitability, iii) the existence of...

In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office of citizens with heterogeneous ability and heterogeneous motivation. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our theoretical framework...

How do wage and other financial benefits affect the set of candidates for political office? We answer the question by studying self-selection into politics of individuals with heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous motivations. Our predictions are in line with the efficiency wage results...

<title>Abstract</title> We develop a theoretical framework, based on a moneylender--firm relationship with moral hazard, to investigate whether enterprise capital structure differs between for-profit and nonprofit sectors. The nondistribution constraint of the nonprofit organizations increases the fraction of...

Using a longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 504 nonprofit and for-profit firms operating in the social residential sector in Italy, we investigate the relation between capital structure and type of enterprise. The nondistribution constraint typical of nonprofit organizations rises the...