The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and...

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides...

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agree- ments (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assump- tion by considering...

Game theory is used to analyze the formation and stability of coalitions for environmental protection. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007a). The integrated assessment model FUND...

The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using...

Using the FUND model, an impact assessment is conducted over the 21st century for rises in sea level of up to 2-m/century and a range of socio-economic scenarios downscaled to the national level, including the four SRES storylines. This model balances the costs of retreat with the costs of...

More technology implies higher welfare. Therefore, it is individually rational to cooperate on technological development. It is not individually rational cooperate on greenhouse gas emission reduction. If technology cooperation only comes with cooperation on emission reduction, incentives to...

One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today’s CO2 emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction...

We investigate the relationship between a thousand-year history of violent conflict in Europe and various reconstructions of temperature and precipitation. We find that conflict was more intense during colder periods. This relationship is weakening over time, and is not robust to the details of...

The costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction are investigated with abatement of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide using the FUND model. The central policy scenario keeps anthropogenic radiative forcing below 4.5 Wm-2. If CO2 emission reduction were the only possibility to meet this...