Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we ask how different firm characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from using team production. To compute the predicted benefits from using team production, we estimate structural...

Using a sample of skilled workers from a cross section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the U.S., I present evidence suggesting that relative performance of workers determines promotions, supporting the notion of internal promotion competitions in which internal hiring policies...

We use data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) employer survey to document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit firms than in for-profit firms. We propose an incentives-based explanation for this result and offer empirical...

I estimate a structural model of teams, autonomy, and financial performance, using a cross section of British establishments. My findings suggest that team production improves financial performance for the typical establishment but that autonomous teams do no better than closely supervised or...

I estimate the effect of team production on labor productivity and product quality using a cross section of British establishments. A distinguishing feature of this study is its use of a structural model that treats as endogenous the organizations’ choices of teams and whether or not to grant...

Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that among the sampled...

Using data from the 1992–95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases...

This study shows that standard regressions estimated to measure a trade-off between wages and health insurance are misspecified by insufficiently accounting for establishment and firm size; an interactive, size-corrected specification is more likely to reveal a trade-off. Furthermore, because...

The authors empirically test Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors...

A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that delegation of authority and incentives should have a positive relationship. Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we show that the positive relationship between incentives and delegation that has been...