This paper uses experiments to investigate the evolution of communication. We consider simple games of information transmission in which the interests of senders and receivers are imperfectly aligned. We show that under four canonical incentive conditions the no-communication hypothesis can be...

We analyze simple adaptive learning processes to model the evolution of effective communication in cheap-talk games with initially meaningless signals. We suggest that learning rules may be sensitive to the information available to players at the population level. As a consequence, learning...

This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means for saying noval things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a rich and changing...

This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee...

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This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our...

The smoothed maximum score estimator of the coefficient vector of a binary response model is consistent and asymptotically normal under weak distributional assumptions. However, the differences between the true and nominal levels of tests based on smoothed maximum score estimates can be very...