Special interests attempt to influence lawmakers through campaign contributions and through informational lobbying. Both avenues have been explored extensively in theoretical models. Only the former, however, has received much empirical scrutiny. We provide the first empirical tests of the major...

Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. This candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over assemblies are...

We offer a selective survey of the uses of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of legal rules and institutions. In so doing, we illustrate some of the ways in which law influences behavior, analyze the mechanism design aspect of legal rules and institutions, and examine...

This pioneering Handbook contains specially-commissioned chapters on tort law from leading experts in the field. This volume evaluates issues of vital importance to those seeking to understand and reform the tort law and the litigation process, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, including...

This volume provides a state-of-the-art overview of the literature on the economic analysis of tort law. In sixteen chapters, the specialist authors guide the reader through the often vast literature in each domain providing a balanced and comprehensive summary. Particular attention is paid to...

With contributions from some of the leading scholars in law and economics, this comprehensive book summarizes the state of economic research on litigation, procedure and evidence.

With contributions from some of the leading scholars in law and economics, this comprehensive book summarizes the state of economic research on litigation, procedure and evidence.