When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect...

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games,...

The purpose of this paper is to consider the problem of optimal income taxation in the domain of progressive (convex) income tax function. This paper proves the existence of an optimal tax function and that the optimal marginal and average tax rates tend asymptotically to 100 percent as income...

We study the process, called the IEDI process, of iterated elimination of (strictly) dominated strategies and inessential players for finite strategic games. Such elimination may reduce the size of a game considerably, for example, from a game with a large number of players to one with a few...