The object of the paper will be to investigate the effect of pre- play communication on the evolution of strategies for playing a given game. Communication is modelled as cheap talk: before the game is played, the players simultaneously exchange messages from some finite set of messages. There...

We consider the situation in which individuals in a finite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payoff. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected...

In 1987, I wrote a paper (Binmore [14]) that questioned the rationality of the backward induction principle in finite games of perfect information. Since that time, a small literature has grown up in which Antonelli and Bicchieri [1], Ben-Porath [9], Bicchieri [10,11], Bonanno [21,22], Pettit...

We derive continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in games. Depending on how we construct the continuous limit, we obtain a continuous approxi-mation that is either an ordinary differential equation (ODE) or a stochastic differential equation (SDE). Our SDE approximation...

Foundresses of the ant Messor pergandei start colonies cooperatively throughout much of its geographical range. Previous work shows that foundresses of this and similar species associate without reference to kinship; that foundress cooperation ends upon adult worker emergence through lethal...

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mecha-nisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of complexity...

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two- player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes infinite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and does not depend on risk-dominance relations. As the number of messages...

Gary Becker devotes a chapter of his Treatise on the Family to Polygamy and Monogamy in marriage markets. The inclusion of polygamy in his analysis is more than an intriguing curiosum. Although overt polygamy is rare in our own society, it is a very common mode of family organization around the...

In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has explained this phenomenon by demon-strating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. Taking as a starting...

We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of suppol ting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A...