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We study a two-sector model of economic growth with labor augmenting external effects. Using general specifications of the technologies, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy. We show that, when the investment good sector is capital intensive at the private level,...
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We develop a two-sector model to analyze which kind of social <p> organization generates trust. Social capital is de…ned as trust. We examine two <p> communities: the bedroom community in which people commute long distance <p> to work and the virility community in which people do not commute to work. <p>...</p></p></p></p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652477
We study how trust is generated in society. In a two-sector <p> model, we analyze two communities. In the bonding community people do not <p> trust people outside their regular networks. In the bridging community people <p> choose to trust strangers when they meet them. The hypothesis is that when <p> trust...</p></p></p></p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652487
We develop a two-sector model to analyze which kind of social <p> organization generates social capital. The hypothesis is that social capital must <p> be added as an important production factor when considering decentralization <p> of production. Thus, market centralization processes in a capitalist...</p></p></p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652495
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We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011159137
We consider coordination situations with a conflict of interest, and experimentally vary the inefficiency of an equal earnings equilibrium, as well as the number of efficient and unequal earnings equilibria. We observe that equality, as long it is not extremely inefficient, remains very salient,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010890958
Fairness considerations are important determinants of behavior in unstructured bargaining situations with equal bargaining power. If the surplus over which the bargaining takes place was created by separate, individual efforts, several entitlement-related fairness ideals might be relevant. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010890966