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Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005654748
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408954
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005733734
Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549915
We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard allocation rules such as Walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824625
We consider the endogenous choice of a voting rule, characterized by the majority size needed to elect change over the status quo, by a society who will use the rule to make future decisions. Under simple assumptions on the uncertainty concerning the future alternatives that will be voted upon,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134974
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230814
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482031
We consider discontinuous games with incomplete information. Auctions are a leading example. With standard tie breaking rules (or more generally, sharing rules), these games may not have equilibria. We consider sharing rules that depend on the private information of players. We show that there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482062
We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory price auctions where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. Bidders observe private signals that are affiliated with the common value. We show that the average price in the auction is biased downward from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482102