We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman...

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman...

We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global...

We present attractiveness, a re…nement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain...

Operations which form new risk measures from a collection of given (often simpler) risk measures have been used extensively in the literature. Examples include convex combination, convolution, and the worst-case operator. Here we study the risk measure that is constructed from a family of given...

Toward the late 1990s, several research groups independently began developing new, related theories in mathematical finance. These theories did away with the standard stochastic geometric diffusion "Samuelson" market model (also known as the Black-Scholes model because it is used in that most...

In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games....

This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and...