We consider situations in which shares of n firms are held by the same n firms as well as by individual investors. The problem is to determine the actual control of the firms by the individual investors. In part 1, we develop the mathematical model, and explain the basic notions of clutter and...

In 2013, the International Game Theory Review published two special issues on open problems in cooperative games: the first regarding theory (Fragnelli and Gambarelli, 2013a) and the second applications (Fragnelli and Gambarelli, 2013b). In this paper, our aim is to present some problems...

No abstract received.

No abstract received.

Many decisions in different fields of application have to take into account the joined effects of two elements that can interfere with each other. For example, in Industrial Economics the demand of an asset can be influenced by the supply of another asset, with synergic or antagonistic effects....

A technique is proposed to represent games in characteristic function form as games in normal form, enabling the former to exploit the concepts of solution of the latter. A new solution for games in characteristic function form is then introduced and some properties are found. A generalization...

In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative. Under appropriate conditions on the penalty strategy of the cooperative,...