Fertility decline in developing countries may have unexpected demographic consequences. Although lower fertility improves nutrition, health, and human capital investments for surviving children, little is known about the relationship between fertility outcomes and female-male offspring...

The severe anti-female bias in natality and child mortality that gives rise to India’s missing women has been widely documented and various explanations ranging from agricultural labor demand to dowries have been offered in the literature. In general, the low demand for girls has been...

We use the fertility histories of over 70,000 Indian women from the Third National Family and Health Survey to investigate the relationship between family size and offspring sex ratios in India. We find that families with three or more children exhibit gender equality in offspring sex ratios. In...

We investigate the relationship between economic deregulation (delicensing), skill upgrading, and wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s in India. We use a unique dataset on India's industrial licensing regime to test whether industrial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s played a role...

This paper aims to summarize the unexplained propensity of children to engage in work, school, or neither. After controlling for a wide range of determinants of child labor, schooling, and idleness, we estimate a hierarchical model that allows for heteroskedastic, spatially correlated random...

We examine ascending auctions with independent private values and a buyout option. The buyout option gives each buyer the opportunity to end the auction prematurely and acquire the object for a fixed price. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that buyers with...

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (polynomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common...

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (polynomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common...

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key...

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key...