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Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization

Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (1996) 4, pp. 409-428

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005521012

Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems

Suh, Sang-Chul; Wen, Quan - In: Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2008) 1, pp. 163-174

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369342

A mechanism implementing the proportional solution

Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Review of Economic Design 1 (1994) 1, pp. 301-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370570

An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability

Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 25 (1996) 1, pp. 109-122

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005374107

Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution

Suh, Sang-Chul; Wen, Quan - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2006) 1, pp. 61-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005388323

A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

Suh, Sang-Chul; Wen, Quan - In: Economic Theory 40 (2009) 2, pp. 203-226

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005004283

Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Shin, Sungwhee; Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Economics Letters 96 (2007) 1, pp. 103-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005095451

Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting

Shin, Sungwhee; Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Environment and Development Economics 8 (2003) 02, pp. 247-260

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100377

Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem

Shin, Sungwhee; Suh, Sang-Chul - In: Journal of Economic Theory 77 (1997) 1, pp. 205-213

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081477

The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching

Suh, Sang-Chul; Wen, Quan - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We investigate an extensive form sequential matching game of perfect information. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential matching game leads to the unique stable matching when the Eeckhout Condition (2000) for existence of a unique stable matching holds, regardless of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069297